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The NATO involvement in Libya continues characterized by an anticipated ambiguity 
about next steps, overall goals and methods of reaching those goals as well as the real 
possibility that this timely intervention may, in fact, have saved thousands of lives.  The 
decision to intervene in Libya, while first resisted by the Obama administration has been 
generally accepted by both Democrats and Republicans in Washington who have 
disagreed about the timing and methods, but less about the decision itself.  While there 
has been some dissent and criticism of the Obama administration for this decision, most 
of that has come from the ideological extremes or from ordinary citizens. 
The intervention in Libya could become one of the biggest foreign policy successes of 
recent years if it is seen as preventing mass killings and helping move a nasty dictator out 
of power, or as a major policy failure if the U.S. gets pulled into yet another long term 
entanglement with no end in sight.  Regardless of the outcome, the decision to intervene 
is, even at this time, additionally significant because it is a clear victory for the bipartisan 
American foreign policy establishment where the need for an interventionist foreign 
policy, the ability of the US to get what it wants and the cost of various interventions are 
rarely questioned. 
The foreign policy establishment was not, of course, unanimous in calling for 
intervention in Libya.  The opposition in congress came primarily from the far left, 
including people like Dennis Kucinich and the far right, including people like Ron Paul, 
while most politicians in between those poles supported the intervention.  Within the 
administration Defense Secretary Robert Gates, a man with deep roots in the foreign 
policy establishment, was one of the strongest voices against the intervention, but much 
of the rest of the bipartisan foreign policy leadership, ranging from the center left to the 
right supported this intervention. 
The decision to intervene was made largely because Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
persuaded President Obama it was worth it. It would be hard to think of a better metaphor 
for the foreign policy establishment’s power within the administration than Clinton 
convincing Obama to change his mind.  The 2008 primary between these two was, 
among other things, a battle between the establishment personified by Clinton who had 
been a fixture in Washington since the early 1990s and Obama who was, as late as 2007, 
a genuine outsider in Washington. 
The intervention in Libya arises from the same mix of humanitarian and self-interested 
motives as many recent interventions.  In Bosnia and Kosovo the outcome was somewhat 
successful.  In Iraq and elsewhere this has been far less clear.  In the former two actions, 
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American casualties have been relatively few while in Afghanistan and Iraq the cost has 
been considerably higher in lives and treasure. Similar examples can be found throughout 
the entire post-war period.  The foreign policy community has a built in bias towards 
intervention which leads many in that establishment them to frequently spin out the 
rosiest scenarios and cite only the positive precedents, but it is always important to be 
prepared for things not to go well and to think about the gloomiest scenarios.  It is 
surprising how quickly this lesson, made so obvious in Iraq, has been forgotten. 
The residual power of the foreign policy establishment indicates that, at least for now, the 
U.S. will continue to approach foreign policy decisions within the same narrow policy 
bandwidth based upon the same assumptions of the last several decades and that the 
power of new forces in American politics such as the anti-war left or the isolationist wing 
of the Tea Party has been exaggerated.  However, it is not yet clear whether this indicates 
a resurgence of the foreign policy establishment or a last triumph of a waning 
establishment heralding a new approach to foreign policy.  It is likely that the answer to 
that will be determined not in Washington, but in Libya.  Accordingly, if the foreign 
policy establishment is to survive, it must get Libya right. 
